I’m rather fond of this, and I figured I might as well bring it over where the posts are searchable.
Television and the past
Television is the most important artistic medium available to Americans today. I suggest this because I believe television is the only viable current successor to theater, and theater is—or, rather, was—something special. Historically, the role of theater is to bring communities together for a shared experience—to “communicate” in the Deweyan (or the Nietzschean, though Nietzsche meant it as an insult) sense; this role is not played by many other art forms. Thus theater is one of the natural foundations of cultural literacy1—of the shared ideas, phrases, images, and archetypes which form the material for communication, ranging from new art to sermons to business letters to political speeches, and cultural literacy is the lifeblood of a community, especially a democratic community that is reluctant to delegate all of its cultural activities to specialized elites. (Hannah Arendt1 has written in The Human Condition on the intimate relationship between politics and theater, both being privileged venues for pure action.)
Many art forms, and most especially the book—which, for many people, is the victim in the story of the success (or whatever) of television—are not well equipped to provide this sort of shared experience. Books are very good at creating a connection between two or a handful of people across time and space, for creating virtual communities that, for example, allow me to fall madly in love with a French woman who died decades before I was born (Simone Weil), but very bad at bringing together people who are part of existing actual communities, especially relatively large and busy ones, like a city, or a nation.
The book has not been supplanted by the television. The practice of watching television has not replaced the individual immersing himself in a world of text (a practice of which I am also very much in favor), but the practice of communities immersing themselves together in a common experience.
While theater itself still exists as such, it no longer approximates in any way its former role; it exists now for elites, hobbyists, and tourists. It is not a normal or an extensive part of community life. That role has been taken over by first film and now television, and in the future possibly content distributed via the internet and viewed on a variety of appliances ranging from home theaters to portable personal video players, but in any case by the much and unfairly reviled flickering screen in whatever embodiment. (More on why I’m talking about television rather than movies later.)
Now, television has points of convergence and points of divergence with the role played by theater historically. It is a collective experience uniting diverse members of a geopolitical community, and it provides the ground of our current cultural literacy, exemplified in watercooler debriefs of last night’s shows and in the proliferation of television-derived metaphors and anecdotes in our normal speech and writing. Allusions to literature have been supplanted, in many of the classrooms, living rooms, and coffee shops I’ve occupied, by allusions to The Simpsons, which has the kind of cultural-literacy market share that Dickens or Shakespeare once had, but have no longer.
Television differs from theater mostly in terms of the consequences of its technology. A theater experience is physically shared; you can see and smell the audience around you; you can hear it gasp or laugh or heckle. One may watch television with family and friends, but this always still has the stamp of the private, and therefore, perhaps, is less constitutive of a community. However, whatever this loss is, in exchange you get the capacity to tie together not just a town or a considerable portion of a city, but the better part of an entire nation, and, in the case of America, a nation desperately in need of more cultural common ground. This strikes a sort of middle ground between the traditional, virtual-community-building of books and the concrete actual-community-building of theater; while it’s true that the vast majority of the people with whom you share a television program are spread across space, they are usually localized in time—thus the watercooler conversation. Thus the immediate entry of reference-able material into the cultural mainstream.
Television also, and here not only as a result of technical affordances alone, differs in the kind of storytelling it provides. A television show may last for years—decades, even, in the case of some soap operas and news programs. The extent to which programs capitalize on this varies. Some are almost entirely episodic, using recurring characters and themes, but ultimately telling the same stories again and again; this is not essentially different from familiar genres like commedia dell’arte. Other shows are designed around long-term story arcs of varying length—but, owing to the production cycles of the industry, not usually longer than a season. (Obviously there are exceptions, including the recent work of JJ Abrams, which demonstrate multi-season plotting as an integral feature.) The possibility of long-term storytelling has the potential to deepen the community experience, creating imagined histories of a scope not encountered in the theater. A traditional theater troupe in theory could, but in practice never would, make this kind of commitment. But the centralization and specialization (and yes, the metastatic growth) of the Hollywood machine open up this possibility.
Television and the present
Now, there is clearly a flaw in my logic thus far, or, at least, an important point I’ve been glossing over. I refer, of course, to the well-known fact, the truism, that television sucks—by which I mean not that television as a medium is somehow corruptive or bad, but that much of what is presented in that medium is unimpressive. Television has not, by and large, lived up to its potential.
Setting aside the possibility that dumbass particles are an unavoidable byproduct of cathode ray tubes, the most obvious explanation for TV’s quality issues is the marketplace. In any market situation, people sell what other people will pay for—that is, what they want, or can be made to want, enough to pay for. Sellers will of course have an incentive to sell what can be produced cheaply and dependably (not what can be made dependable, mind you). This fact is not very inimical to the process of constructing a towel rack or, with suitable safety and environmental regulations, even a car. It is not, however, a fitting guardian of art and culture.
The profit motive in art tends to reduce it to entertainment. This is not to say that art should not entertain; indeed, it is of great importance that art be interesting, engaging, enjoyable, but it is also important that it be more than just these things. Efficient production in television means an unhealthy dependence on familiar plot formulae, short or nonexistent story arcs, and old, old jokes3.
Possibly more serious is the extent to which the consumer demand for emotionally positive and simple storytelling undercuts the ability of American popular art to work with the domain of tragedy. Tragic storytelling—which deals with the limits of our powers—the possibility of real loss which is not redeemed by some compensatory victory, the ways in which even when we are at our best—when we are being heroes of whatever stripe—we still betray ourselves and each other, and the possibility of real conflict between virtues, goods, and rights. These are aspects of life which cannot be effaced by consumers’ desire to be told pretty stories, and when we attempt to avoid this fact, the consequences are at times quite dire. (Cf. US foreign policy.) If art is to bear any relation to reality—and whether you think that art reflects life or life reflects art or both, there should be some relationship—it has to be able to handle stories that run counter to our ironclad will to optimism.
It is tempting to place the lion’s share of the blame for the media marketplace on consumers; if they just wanted what was good for them, Hollywood would sell it. But that’s not exactly what’s happening. There’s a persistent incentive for Hollywood to make the minimum possible product within any range of what the consumer would be willing to pay for. What is more, there is an incentive to use advertising to reinforce the acceptability of the minimal and reduce the expectation, even the sense of the possibility of, the maximum. Thus, between the demons of market and marketing, it is not clear how much power a viewer really has to change his mind about what he wants—in the absence of options.
Aaron Sorkin, one of the great living artists in the medium, has suggested somewhere that it is not that people don’t want something better, it’s that they don’t know the possibility is out there, and wouldn’t even know what it looked like if you asked them to describe it. After all, they lack a frame of reference in which the question would make sense. If you go ahead and give it to them, you may find that they do come to want it, or even that it was something they had been wanting all along4. As to the success of Sorkin’s prediction as applied to his own work, results are mixed; Sports Night suffered an early demise, while West Wing was a success and remains so after Sorkin’s departure and the show’s devolution to a more basic level of storytelling.
The most obvious, though not, I think, the best solution to this problem is public television, and PBS has, in fact, been vitally important, especially in the sphere of nonfiction. Indeed, it is indispensable to have programs like Nova and 3-2-1 Contact widely available to the public and produced apart from the coercion of profit motive. (The reporting of popular science, like that of politics, is an arena in which truth is sometimes fragile.) And Sesame Street is rare (and not just in television) for its respect, care, accessibility, and its high expectations about what kids can understand.
I am less impressed, however, by the inexplicable (or, rather, indefensible) affinity of PBS for cooking shows, or the fact that PBS caters to a narrow audience often excluding the people for whom TV is the most important cultural medium and for whom access to high-quality, no-cost viewing would be most beneficial. In a sense, PBS is “TV for people who read”; what we need is to pursue excellence in TV for people who watch.
So let’s return to the slums of regular commercial television for a moment. If we set aside the reality shows (which are demonstrations of all that is ugly about the human animal, and not in a good way) and the fascist, contentless police procedurals and the “dumpy guy with large-breasted wife” comedies, there are a few great shows that serve as evidence of the possibility of tapping the potential of television as an artistic medium for a national community.
In the present tense, two names leap to mind: Aaron Sorkin and JJ Abrams. Sorkin, who began in theater and transitioned to film before doing television (and who has declared that he considers television the more interesting and powerful medium), brought us the short-lived Sports Night (imdb) and the more successful, but also more conventional, West Wing. (imdb) Sorkin’s writing presents us with images of civic virtue that recall William James’s vision of a “moral equivalent of war.” James called on us to find ways of conceiving of public service as a kind of heroism, with all the trappings that entails, non-military ways of having heroism, drama, “manliness,” and the struggle between good and evil, and Sorkin’s West Wing is one of the best attempts to help us imagine this concretely.
Sorkin has helped us to make the imaginative leap necessary to see past our well-justified skepticisms regarding the authenticity of professional politics and the popular media, to give us a sense of what it would look like to, for example, choose a leader who is something more than the lesser evil.
Sorkin’s stories are full of a morality that is not simplistic and does not pander to constituencies, but consistently challenges expectations and asks questions for which we may not have answers. He also, far more than most makers of American entertainment, is able to deal with the element of the tragic. His emphasis is on the “modern” style of tragedy5 (i.e., reflections on the limits of our powers in the face of circumstance) and on problems of loyalty and responsibility—difficult subjects for Americans to deal with outside of sensationalism or pedantry.
Sorkin’s work is not plot-driven; like Greek philosophy, its basic structure is dialogue—the encounter of two powerful speaking subjects. And unlike Greek philosophy, Sorkin can accomplish such encounters without privileging one voice over the other; even when an argument is clearly lost, it is not a straw man; it is a real and serious struggle in which meaningful things have been said.
Sorkin’s work so far has not really fit into the landscape of television. Sports Night failed partly because it was something essentially different from other shows; viewers did not know whether to take it as a comedy or a drama (as edgy animated comedy Family Guy puts it, “I finally get Aaron Sorkin’s Sports Night: it’s a comedy that’s too good to be funny!”), and many were doubtless thrown off by thinking it might be about sports. These are problems that aggressive marketing and good scheduling could have ameliorated, but ABC put little or no effort into bringing viewers to the table. West Wing had better success, partly because it is more close to viewer expectations (it looks and feels like a quasi-normal hour-long professional drama at first glance), and also because it had more well-known talent and content that many recalled from Sorkin’s successful film The American President—and of course, it tapped into the basic fascination of the office of the president. However, problems arose here as well, this time internally, because Sorkin’s extensive role in the writing of each episode—which was a key factor in the quality of the show—made West Wing relatively expensive to produce, and this ultimately led to Sorkin and collaborator Thomas Schlamme leaving the show.
JJ Abrams, on the other hand, lives and breathes plot, spinning as though without effort complex and interwoven story arcs and constantly evolving relationships. Superficially, he confines himself to the most commercially viable of formats—spies in skimpy outfits on Alias, and in Lost a castaway epic that would probably never have hit the airwaves if it couldn’t be pitched as a gigantic Survivor reference. But despite the seemingly unrisky format of Alias, Abrams has used the show to explore the complex and tenuous nature of human relationships; people turn it on expecting sex and violence and they may not realize that it is about trust and betrayal, love and hate, loyalty, patriotism, and especially about what happens when these forces that hold us together come into conflict. This, together with an attention to the peculiar problem of destiny, the burden of history (especially of the “sins of the father” variety), and the struggle for redemption give Abrams his own, rather Greek, slice of the tragic sensibility. Lost, on the other hand, probes the intersection of identity and choice, and uses the loss of civilization to leverage the exposure of inner character and morality beyond mores.
Both Abrams and Sorkin have mixed success records. Sorkin’s Sports Night never got any traction, and while West Wing was successful, the creative strategies Sorkin used were not compatible with the show’s budget and shooting schedule, and Alias has not had the ratings or attention (or security) it deserved until the more popular Lost came along in a feeder time slot. And many other similarly impressive shows have failed to make it past their first season or two: Karen Sisco, for example, which was unusual for the specificity and depth of its female protagonist7, or some morally rich and deeply characterized fantasy and horror shows like American Gothic, Brimstone, G vs. E, Miracles, and the amazing White Dwarf8, as opposed to their more popular but also less deep counterparts like The X-Files. Other interesting shows have survived by becoming progressively less interesting—Everwood being a good example of this phenomenon.
Other shows are less powerful, but still important because of their impact on American cultural literacy. I’ve already mentioned The Simpsons, which has been notoriously extensive in its range of set-ups, plots, and ideas, to the point where a couple years ago there was talk of stopping the show because the writers had already done everything. Obviously they’re still making shows now, but nonetheless the incredible range of human behavior, of topical subject-matter, etc., that appears within The Simpsons does make it ideal as a venue for cultural literacy; it’s power for short-handing, metaphor building, etc. let it play for us today the role that Shakespeare played in the time of ED Hirsch’s father6. The problem here is that The Simpsons is not as complete a cultural product as Shakespeare; it is devoid of the tragic or, indeed, anything serious9.
We’ve also seen a recent renaissance in hour-long cable-network dramas. The added freedom of the more sheltered production environment and a more adventuresome audience encourage risk-taking and allow creators to explore the darker side of life—ceding a greater role to death, violence, angst, and existential speculation. However, the difficulty with this freedom is that it derives from and is provided to the narrower audience of premium cable subscribers—which grouping carries class implications and, in theory at least, age restrictions that isolate the cultural influence of such programs from the youth culture where it can do the most good. A degree of compromise may be found with original dramas on basic cable; The Shield, Nip/Tuck, Rescue Me, and Battlestar Galactica being names that leap to mind as critically acclaimed10.
Another source of programming sheltered from the optimism-hungry demands of American broadcast is Japan; the sad and sweet Cowboy Bebop, to name the most obvious example, puts almost all recent American attempts at noir storytelling to shame with its compassion and introspection—while still utilizing the form of the action comedy. (In cinema, Out of Sight attempted something like this, with so-so success, while Road to Perdition, with heavy Japanese influence, produced something of a related (though very stiff and a bit heavy-handed) worth.
Of course, all of this is very recent, because I haven’t been watching TV seriously for very long. There are, of course, older shows that are of equal or greater value; Taxi, that noblest of sitcoms, is a good example, a meditation on the promises and disappointments of American dreams; Wiseguy also leaps to mind—a show which gets at a greater than usual share of conflicting rights and loyalties, the question of more than one kind of honor and justice, not to mention the Apollonian-Dionysian implications of Kevin Spacey’s character in season two. (And yes, it is telling that these feel “old” to me, when they don’t even break the b&w barrier…)
I am also ignoring Joss Whedon, another important voice in television; Whedon already has more than enough apologists.
Television and the future
So, how might we hope to achieve some progress in getting television not to suck?
Governmental and charitable interventions (alternatives to PBS)
I believed that the privileged point of leverage is with broadcast programming (or, to some (probably increasing) extent, basic cable), where there is the most accessibility and the broadest audience—but also where high-quality shows have the most trouble getting a toehold. I would support aggressive efforts on the part of the government to make it possible for important and worthwhile programming to succeed in this environment; this might mean government subsidies for shows like early West Wing that turn out a higher quality product (especially those that, like West Wing have important consequences for public perception of things like civic duty and political participation) at a proportionately higher cost, and/or for shows like Sports Night, which were under-viewed partly because their networks could not or would not promote them properly.
More realistically, it might involve the the development of federally sponsored awards and other programs that provide recognition for shows that are, generally, good theater, and also for shows that help raise the level of public debate11, but never for shows that achieve the latter at the expense of the former—because while it is important to combat the brain-drain effect of the Hollywood market, it’s also important to retain the viewability and accessibility of programming.
Other possibilities for funded interventions might include grants to writers and creators developing difficult projects, or the creation or support of initiatives designed to connect emerging creators with innovative ideas with big-name talent studio production dollars.
All of this effectively ignores the possibility of producing important art within the context of public television as it now exists in America, but of course, PBS has always also ignored this possibility. (PBS is good at being informative, but never at being creative.) It is unlikely that the level of funding necessary to produce good programming could be achieved entirely on the basis of government and private contributions, though this may change with shifts in the cost of production resulting from new technological developments. (See below)
Changes in production and distribution, and their consequences
DVD box sets
There are a number of shifts happening in the way that media are produced, distributed, and used. One of the biggest shifts is in the increased market for Complete Nth Seasons of things, a shift closely tied to the DVD format. (While DVDs are, as C. Harris has pointed out to me on a couple of occasions, an overrated format, especially compared to the magnet tape storage they are replacing, their compactness and menu-based browsing are much better suited to the presentation of seasons of television programs.)
This has meant that television shows can be used more like fixed texts in addition to being used like oral traditions (i.e., as part of a stable record to which many of us have access, where previously they had only functioned as a malleable set of overlapping memories), and has also been leveraged by some shows with small but intense user communities (“cult classics”) to enable comebacks of one or another kind, like the remarkable return to broadcast of Family Guy or the upcoming Firefly film. I suspect that this will have a positive effect on the expectations of viewers; as the saying goes (was it Santayana?), those who do not know history are doomed to repeat it, and box DVD sets tend to make the past which viewers have experienced more explicitly fixed in their minds, meaning that they will be more likely to want either new material or material that builds intelligently on the old material it rehashes. It will also favor the deepening of cultural engagement by fans in the material, thus speeding the incorporation of elements into shared cultural literacy.
Democratization of media
With digital video taking off and personal and small-business computing gaining power for specialized tasks like video editing, production is less and less dependent on the centralized hollywood infrastructure. For more information, see the detailed self-aggrandizement of the Apple PR machine at http://apple.com
In the future, more and more media will be produced either place-independent (and even in many places at once) or around smaller local centers (of which the Bay Area will almost certainly be one). This means it will be easier for small- to mid-scale projects to get off the ground.
It will also be more and more possible for individuals to produce video content with higher standards on a more rapid timetable. More importantly, decentralized distribution methods will follow the developments in blogging and podcasting that have essentially given everyone the power of individual print and radio publishing.
Now, just because everyone can have a blog does not mean that everyone will have a good blog. Quite the contrary, and similarly with emerging video content. Also, there are some concerns regarding the development of ego-casting—i.e., technologies designed to narrowly tailor my media consumption to my personal interests.
However, those who harp on the isolationist qualities of emergent entertainment forms are generally paying insufficient attention to the increasingly social character of the internet (and the increasingly internet-based nature of other entertainment technologies)—services and features related to tagging, rating, annotation, discussion, etc., most of which will themselves be easier and easier to disseminate and organize using RSS—that will re-integrate the individual viewing and listening practices into larger communities, and will probably elevate some independent producers to national attention. (Variations on the “slashdot” effect, for example, will probably be occupying marketing professionals for many years to come.)
Also, it should be noted that while increasing the raw amount of media produced will not in itself raise the average quality of them (quite the contrary), over the long run there is probably a benefit associated with giving viewers more and more choices driven by more personal, idiosyncratic visions—and less by industrial interests. (This is not to say that commercial viability is not a driving force in the majority of those personal visions—the use of journalistic blogging in attempting to launch careers in traditional journalism, or at least gain the fabled “fifteen minutes,” has demonstrated this.)
Here again it would be useful for the government or private foundations to take up a role in furthering the promotion of high-quality content—but here again, this is unlikely to work out.
It will also be important that attention be paid to the interactions of sub-cultures and pocket communities; analysis of social networks pertaining to media consumption, discursive communities, and cultural literacy should be undertaken, and consequences for k-12 curriculum might need to considered. It has always been important that schools teach kids to be critical consumers of media, and schools have always largely failed in this responsibility; as media become decentralized, this task will be much more important, but with the increase and diversification of producers of media and with more and more social tools for thinking and choosing together, it will also probably be a more feasible task. I should point out that the responsibility of public education to help children mediate between overlapping communal identities and discourses is nothing new, as John Dewey identified it quite clearly in the first chapters of his Democracy and Education. Making children good critical consumers of multiple, interconnected cultures is an essential duty of democratic education, though this is often obscured by the (eurocentric and otherwise suspect) integrationist aspirations of the Horace Mann school of educational theory and rhetoric.
(I should also note that it seems likely that secondary school electives like school newspapers and literary magazines, yearbooks, etc. may be the best existing model we have of the kind of amateur micropublishing environment that internet-based media production fosters, and thus these activities may become more and more important—less electives and more core curricula—as the skills they build become more and more the basic skills of civic and professional life; indeed, we may over time see a partial or total inversion of their relationship with the core subjects.)
By way of disclaimer, I do not mean to suggest that it is inevitable that television and its successors will begin more and more to achieve their potential, but that reasonably anticipatable developments will probably make it more and more possible for people and groups below the level of the freakin’ huge corporation to have an impact—for good or evil—on the creation of media.
1 Obviously I’m doing things with this of which ED Hirsch (Cultural Literacy) would not approve; Hirsch’s basic premise is one I’m very fond of, but I disagree with almost everything he extrapolates from it. (Note: Of course theater and television are not the only media that serve this function, but few serve it to the extent they do/did. One exception that leaps to mind is the medieval cathedral, which was offered as a predecessor to modern television in one of the articles in the wonderful The Future of the Book edited by Geoffrey Nunberg of Language Log. In the article, the cathedral was proposed as a text which the audience would inhabit together, one which was was covered in wall to wall content.)
2 Arendt would probably not be any happier than Hirsch to be deputized into my argument. Oh well.
3 Of course, these things have their place in art, as well. Any enemy of old plot devices will have to throw away his Shakespeare along with his soap operas. But there is a difference between taking a familiar trope as a starting point and building something fine and new upon it and simply playing a totally stale story over and over again as a cow chews cud.
4 This echoes one of Sorkin’s dialogues in The American President, in which Michael J. Fox and Michael Douglas debate the reason Americans accept mediocre leaders: do the people “drink sand” because they don’t have water to slake their thirst, or because they are incapable of distinguishing between the two substances? This is a recurring theme in Sorkin; one of his essnetial preoccupations is with the reluctance to settle for less. Both Sports Night and West Wing were meditations on idealism in practice in fields (television journalism mand politics) where those things are normally wholly incompatible. An unwillingness to settle for less—from oneself and from one’s colleagues—is one of the surest marks of a Sorkin protagonist.
5 I encountered this distinction in Cornel West’s The American Evasion of Philosophy.
6 Hirsch’s presentation of the cultural literacy concept centers on the importance of Shakespeare for business writing in his father’s time, versus the communication gap surrounding urban youth.
7 Feminism is a relatively weak point for me, but I think I’m on semi-safe ground saying that there was a difference between Sisco and other strong or strong-ish female characters on television in recent years. Sisco lacked the camp action elements of, say, Buffy or Alias (or, less impressively, Charmed), which tend to walk a line between irony and exploitation, and instead focused on quiet joys and sorrows of being a strong and self-directed woman in a male-dominated world. Sisco also seemed capable of having a sex life without being about her sex life, another unusual feat in Hollywood.
8 White Dwarf actually never made it past its two-hour pilot; it could be superficially glossed as “Northern Exposure in space,” but its arresting, surreal visual texture, its already intricate out-of-box geo-politco-ethical world, and its morally speculative setting made it something fine and, I suppose, doomed.
9 The perceptive reader will have noticed that I keep yapping about tragedy. The reason for that is that one of the ways in which the hollywood market has culturally impoverished America is the total loss of a sense of the tragic dimension of human experience; we tend to insist that the good guys should survive, win, get the girl, say witty things, and be really all around great guys, and the reverse for the other ones. But this means that our art can only be in sync with part of the world—can only have meaning in relation to a glossy and post-produced vision of life.
10 It’s possible that I’m underplaying or overestimating the worth of both premium and basic cable programming, as I have been without regular cable for quite a while, now. However, I have seen many of the shows being discussed either on DVD or on some more connected person’s TV. Insights from cable subscribers with more familiarity and thus more basis for reflection are of course welcome.
11 The Everwood abortion episode, while maintaining its overall alignment with the WB’s pro-life stance, presents an admirably multi-sided and nuanced view of the subject, and especially of the ways in which we do not always feel or act as we expect ourselves to or are expected to. It would provide a good jumping-off point for a class discussion or a family conversation about a very important and sensitive topic, especially for young people with evolving political views.